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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
“Stereotype threat is a general threat not tied to the psychology of particular stigmatized 
groups. It affects the members of any group about whom  there exists  some generally 
known  negative  stereotype (e.g.,  a  grandfather who  fears  that  any  faltering  of 
memory will  confirm or expose  him  to  stereotypes  about  the  aged).  Stereotype 
threat can be thought of as a subtype of the threat posed by negative reputations in 
general.”  Steele, 1997 
  Negative stereotypes, of which all groups suffer, are a matter of concern 
for individuals, specifically for those who have a stake in disproving such stereotypes.  
Besides often being derogatory, the negative stereotypes may cause these individuals 
to over-think or monitor their performance in an attempt to disconfirm such beliefs.  
Ironically, such attempts may cause detriments in cognitive ability or attention that may 
lead one to confirm those negative stereotypes.  Previous research on stereotype 
threat, however, has examined the issue more closely and determined that negative 
stereotypes cause detriments for various reasons.  Though useful in exploring the 
mechanisms of stigma-based threats, using real groups (with their own histories) does 
not afford researchers the ability to examine the effect of negative stereotypes for 
peripherally or loosely held identities.  Using theories of stereotype threat and minimal 
group methodologies the present research aims to explore whether or not stereotype-
based threats can produce similar results using experimental groups, which are 
relatively free of stigmatized or stereotyped histories. 
Stereotype Threat 
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 Individuals often identify closely with their race, gender, religion, as a manner of 
creating their place in society.  Membership may be beneficial when one‟s group is 
stereotyped to be overly successful in a given domain, but a similar (though negative) 
effect can occur when one‟s group is stereotyped to be poor in another domain.  
Consequently, some individuals may suffer not necessarily as a function of their true 
ability, but rather due to the knowledge that their group has been known to perform 
poorly in a given task.  This dilemma, often described as stereotype threat, focuses on 
the effect of negative stigma and how it affects the individuals to whom the stereotype 
would apply.   
In an attempt to explain underperformance of Blacks on standardized tests, 
Steele and Aronson (1995) completed a series of experiments to examine how 
expectations that one could possibly confirm negative stereotypes about one‟s group 
would lead to underperformance on academic tasks.  The first and second study 
involved Black and White participants and their performance in a verbal abilities test.  
The authors hypothesized that Blacks taking a test framed as diagnostic  would perform 
more poorly in comparison to Blacks who took a test that was not framed as diagnostic 
and more poorly in comparison to Whites who heard either set of instructions.  The 
results supported their hypotheses and showed that Black participants did show 
decreased performance in comparison to Blacks who were instructed that the test was 
not diagnostic of intellectual ability as well as to Whites (from whom test label had no 
effect). It should also be noted that Whites‟ performance did not significantly change as 
a function of their condition in either study.  In another study they showed that when 
Blacks indicated their racial category on a pre-test questionnaire, those individuals 
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underperformed in comparison to Whites who indicated their racial category and to both 
Blacks and Whites that did not indicate their racial category.  The authors concluded 
that when activated and made salient via diagnostic testing, negative stereotypes were 
a driving force in explaining underperformance by Blacks in comparison to those without 
such stereotype activation.  It is notable that these seminal findings were the result of 
real-world group effects (i.e. African-Americans and poor math performance) and so it is 
possible that these effects would appear for groups to which negative stigmata were not 
previously known or held by targeted, or „threatened‟, individuals.   
Stereotype threat and related theories have argued that the threat occurs in 
situations for which negative stereotypes are applicable, such as domain-relevant and 
diagnostic testing.  Individuals perceive a risk in which they may confirm a negative 
stigma as it relates to their group.  As a result, individuals would not only confirm 
negative stereotypes of their group, but also confirm the applicability of the stereotype 
regarding their own performance.  When perceiving this possibility for relevant and 
important domains, it may result in the decrease in ability to perform successfully.  
Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) have proposed that stereotype threat is a process 
in which both controlled as well as automatic processing is disrupted through various 
pathway, such as physiological stressors, self and situational monitoring, and 
suppression processes.  These processes interact and eventually overload or otherwise 
decrease the efficacy of an individual‟s working memory.  This decrease of coordinated 
informational processing eventually leads to decreased performance in controlled tasks.   
Additionally, their model holds considerable explanatory power in explaining the 
decreased performance in more automatic processes.  Rather than working memory as 
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the primary factor responsible for performance decrease, individuals begin to monitor 
their otherwise automatic behavior.  As a result, individuals become too vigilant in 
monitoring their behavior for stereotypical responses and suffer in task performance as 
a consequence.  Given that Schmader and colleagues‟ model suggests that changes in 
various factors (physiological stressors, monitoring, and suppression) are the result of 
stereotype threat, it appears that any condition that allows these type of reactions 
should replicate similar effects, regardless of the source of the „threat‟.   
 Past research has shown that stereotype threat occurs in members of different 
groups for which negative stereotypes and stigma exist, such as Blacks (Brown & Day, 
2005; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999) , women 
(Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999), 
Whites (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown, 1999; Stone, 2002), men 
(Brown & Josephs, 1999; Leyens, Desert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000), Asians (Shih, 1999), 
Latinas (Gonzalas, Blanton, & Williams, 2002), the elderly (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & 
Rahhal, 2003), and those low in SES (Croizet & Claire, 1998).  Although these studies 
have found consistent effects of stereotype threat for negatively stereotyped groups, 
there are few, if any, that have attempted to produce threat in individuals via 
experimentally created groups, which should not have pre-existing stereotypes.  Past 
studies have previously tested individuals using methodologies that include not only 
concern for the individual, but also concern for their closely identified and socially salient 
group.  Thus, it‟s possible that individuals may suffer from similar effects even for 
peripherally held groups if the group membership is made salient, individuals identify 
with their group, and the group is described as being deficient in ability in a given 
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domain.  It seems plausible that if stereotype threat is the result of stigma awareness 
and otherwise disrupted controlled processes, then it should follow that even when 
primed with identification of an experimentally created group and placed into a 
threatening environment, performance decreases should follow.  The various conditions 
in which threat occurs will be examined in light of this observation. 
Several reviews (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; Smith, 2004; Wheeler & 
Petty, 2001) have examined the various processes and potential mediators that appear 
to be necessary for stereotype threat to occur.  Schmader and colleagues (2008) have 
conceptualized stereotype threat as being a three-way relationship in which one‟s 
concept of group, concept of ability domain, and concept of self interact with each other 
to produce or not produce threat.  Generally, individuals will experience threat (or at 
least more of it) when one is highly identified with the stigmatized group, are highly 
identified with or believe the performance task to be important to oneself and one‟s ego, 
and also are made aware of a negative stigma that exists between one‟s group and the 
performance task.  These three factors come with their own caveats relative to 
individual differences as well as differing priming techniques that may facilitate or hinder 
the interaction between them.   
Individuals must be aware, consciously or unconsciously, of the negative stigma 
that concerns their group in relation to the performance task for threat to occur.  
Researchers often use individuals who are not aware with any type of stigma as their 
control conditions in contrast to those individuals who are threatened by related stigma.  
For example, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999, Study 2) instructed both men and 
women to complete relatively difficult items from the Graduate Records Exam (GRE).  
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Participants were instructed to take two tests, of which one was described as showing 
clear signs of gender bias, in which men typically out-performed women, and one which 
was described as having no gender differences.  The descriptions of the tests were 
randomized in the experimental session that allowed for a contrast of those who 
received the threat condition and those who received a control condition.  Using one of 
the two tests in their final analyses, the authors found a stereotype threat effect in that 
women who were threatened with gender differences performed significantly poorer 
than men taking the same test while performing equally when not threatened.   
Past studies have activated negative stereotypes without explicit reference 
through manipulations such as explaining the test as highly diagnostic in the test area 
(Steele & Aronson, 1995).  As discussed previously, Steele and Aronson found that 
high-diagnosticity primed Black participants scored significantly lower than their low-
diagnosticity counterparts.  As a necessary factor, individuals must be aware of the 
negative stigma between the group to which they belong and the performance in which 
threat is expected to occur.  It is important to note, however, that simply belonging to a 
group may not always be sufficient, but rather individuals must perceive belonging to 
this group as important for defining their identity.  An individual‟s group membership is 
only important as the value the individual receives from it and accordingly, stereotype 
threat should occur for individuals who have the most to gain from their group identity.  
These identities help to define the individual in terms of ability and self-regard relative to 
the group‟s status.  If an individual‟s group is stigmatized, then the benefits that arise 
from positive group identification may come at a price as characterized by stereotype 
threat.   
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Stereotype threat is linked to negative stereotypes that are self-relevant as 
opposed to other-relevant.  Brown and Josephs (1999) conducted research to show that 
different groups have different priorities that may result in stereotype threat.  A pre-test 
regarding math that identified men as being primarily concerned with showing 
exceptional ability and women were concerned with appearing weak in math.  Their 
results indicated that when given instructions that the test was diagnostic of exceptional 
ability, men exhibited decreased performance relative to women while showing 
increased performance relative to women in a test described as an indicator of one‟s 
weakness in math.  These results indicate that only those negative stereotypes that are 
applicable to one‟s identity and group are likely to cause stereotype threat effects.   As 
outlined above, threat is a process in which individuals are concerned with confirming 
the negative stereotype about their group, ironically prompting psychological processes 
that may lead to decreased performance.  As a consequence, models of threat predict a 
decrease in performance when the stereotype in question is relevant to the individual; 
that is, the individual must belong to the group to which the salient or accessible 
stereotype is applied for the negative effects to take place.   
To illustrate the relation of group salience to priming specific group identities, 
Shih, Pittansky, and Ambady (1999) showed marked differences between Asian-
American women when tested in mathematics.  In Study 1, the authors administered a 
mathematics test after inducing group salience for either the social category Asians 
(high ability in math) or Women (low ability in math).  Following the predictions of threat 
modeling, Asian-American women who were primed to think of themselves belonging to 
the group Women scored significantly lower on a math test than those primed to think of 
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themselves as Asian.  Salience of one‟s group, however, is not the only manner in 
which group identification exerts performance change via stereotype threat.    
In a related situation in which one‟s identity can be influential on stereotype threat 
processes, it appears possible to experimentally manipulate the degree to which 
individuals are likely to identify with qualities of a single identity.  Pronin, Steele and 
Ross (2004) explored how women who had previously taken multiple math courses 
(high-ability) were likely to disparage stereotypic qualities that were associated with 
women‟s seemingly inability to do math, such as flirting and child-bearing but not 
qualities unrelated to stereotypic prototypes, such as empathy.  They furthered these 
results when they showed that women high identified in math ability were presented a 
„scientific article‟ discussing gender differences in the ability of mathematics which 
resulted in a similar pattern of negative quality dismissal but not for positive qualities.  
These findings did not replicate for women low identified in mathematics.  The authors 
concluded that these results were indicative of a bifurcation, or partitioning, of their 
group identity for these high-identified women. Rather than accepting all the qualities 
that are associated with women (both positive and negative for math skill), the women 
chose to distance themselves from some qualities but not from others as a possible 
means of either self-esteem protection which may help fend off stereotype threat 
without losing their identification as women.  This method of bifurcation has also been 
shown to occur on a larger scale across identities rather than qualities of a single group. 
When thinking of one‟s concept of self and which groups they belong to and 
identify with, multiple identities can co-exist. For example, Julie can at one time 
conceptualize herself as a graduate student, a daughter, a woman, an Asian-American, 
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a member of her sorority, etc.  These multiple identities can be made salient at any 
given point and have different effects relative to stereotype threat (Shih et al., 1999).  In 
a manner similar to singular identity bifurcation as was shown previously, these multiple 
identities can serve as a defensive mechanism in which multiple identities diffuse the 
impact of negative stereotypic qualities of any single identity or group.  Gresky, Ten 
Eyck, Lord and McIntyre (2005) experimentally manipulated the degree to which highly 
math-identified women construed their multiple identities and examined the effect on 
their math ability under an explicit statement that women typically scored lower than 
men on math tests.  Specifically, the authors instructed these women to either draw 
relatively small or large self-concept maps with few or many nodes and then asked 
them to solve math problems from the GRE.  Those women who drew smaller self-
concept maps scored significantly poorer than women who were asked to draw large 
maps.  The authors reasoned that by priming participants to view themselves as 
belonging to many group identities (see Linville, 1985) the negative group identity to 
which the salient negative stereotype was directed (women) was not as powerful as 
they could diffuse their identity over other, perhaps more positively stereotyped, groups.   
The third necessary factor for threat to occur is that individuals believe there is a 
positive or high identification between their self-concept and the task domain (Aronson 
et al., 1999; Steele, 1997).  The high identification carries with it an expectation that one 
is likely to perform well on a given task or at the least is personally invested in 
performing well as it pertains to their ego.  Individuals with low identification may not feel 
as though their self-esteem is tied directly into the task.  Additionally, low identified 
individuals may also lack the necessary skills to be affected by stereotype threat.  
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Individuals who lack ability for a task may not be affected by stereotype threat that can 
be measured through normal means; that is, if one has poor ability in math and receives 
threat, their level of performance may already be too low to produce statistical 
differences in comparison to non-threatened individuals with similar levels of identity. 
High identification in relevant domains may often be measured by scales such as the 
Domain Identification Measure (DIM; Smith & White, 2001).  The DIM is a series of 
items that include items such as, “I get good grades in English.” and “How much do you 
enjoy math-related subjects?” and can be used as a reliable proxy to determine who 
should be most threatened and most likely to suffer subsequent performance loss. 
Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele and Brown (1999, Study 2) investigated 
personal identification in math in White men, a group without pre-existing negative 
stereotype for performing poorly in math.   These White men, after being split into a 
moderate and a high identification group, were presented either with information that 
Asians typically outperformed Whites or not.  Their results indicated that those 
categorized as highly identified significantly performed poorer in a threat condition than 
when they were not.  Additionally, only those highly identified participants indicated 
anxiety over being evaluated when in the threat condition as compared to the no-threat 
condition, while those moderately identified did not differ between threat conditions.  
Similarity, Stone and colleagues (Stone et al., 1999, study 2) investigated a moderator 
on the athletic performance in White men.  Participants were surveyed for their level of 
psychological or chronic level of engagement with sports and were dichotomized into 
high and low levels of identification.  These participants were also placed into either a 
high or low misattribution condition, in which those in the high condition were asked to 
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focus some of their attention on the newly renovated lab space and its effects on one‟s 
anxiety while those in the low misattribution condition were given no such notice.  The 
threat manipulation consisted of a threatening or no-threat condition which consisted of 
instructions that their performance was a measure of natural athletic ability or a 
measure of general psychological factors, respectively.  Participants‟ performance was 
measured on their golf ability (number of putts to make a hole).  Their results confirmed 
their initial hypothesis.  High sports identified White men who were told their golf 
performance was a measure of natural athletic ability and who were not given an 
external explanation for any experienced anxiety completed the golf game with the 
highest number of strokes indicating poorer performance.  Again, only those who likely 
shared a link between their performance and their self-concept performed poorly under 
threat conditions.  Low identified participants did not significantly differ on their 
performance regardless of other manipulations.  Given this evidence, it becomes 
important to understand the process through which highly identified individuals, but not 
those low identified, are affected. 
As noted in the reviews above, working memory becomes diluted with thoughts 
of confirming negative stereotypes leading to poorer performance.  Schmader and 
Johns (2003) have examined individual‟s working memory capacity when under 
stereotype threat.  Upon inducing gender-based threat for women and math ability, 
participants were asked to complete math problems while also being asked to memorize 
a series of words.  Their results produced a meditational model in which the relationship 
between stereotype threat and math test performance was mediated by working 
memory capacity, supporting their initial hypothesis that threat serves as a cognitive 
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load upon controlled processing.  These findings are helpful in understanding how 
threat can impact one‟s performance on novel or controlled processes, but working 
memory is not necessarily engaged in relatively automatic tasks.  Indeed automatic 
(over-learned) processing has been shown to be interrupted by similar processes by 
Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, and Carr (2006) when they induced threat in high-
skilled golf players.  However, they found that when asked given a secondary task 
concurrent with threat and a golfing task, the threat was alleviated.  The authors 
reasoned that when the participants were induced with threat, they were likely to over-
focus on automatic processes (golf putting), ironically reducing their performance.  The 
secondary task appeared to remove the performance decreases, most likely by 
reducing the participants‟ lament over the threatening stereotype.  Similar findings have 
found that stereotype rumination in threat-induced women acts as a mediator between 
threat and performance (McIntyre, Paulson, Taylor & Lord, manuscript under revision).  
New research has also identified increased social and emotional brain activity via 
function magnetic resonance imaging in women induced with threat in comparison to 
non-threatened women, who are likely to activate math-related areas (Krendl, Richeson, 
Kelley, & Heatherton, 2008) 
Stereotype threat research began as a means to explore academic performance 
discrepancies in Blacks (Steele & Aronson, 1995) and has since expanded to include 
multiple domains, which is indicative of its pervasiveness.  Consequently, different tasks 
have also been used to provide a means of measuring the effects of threat.  Studies 
using tests of verbal ability or intelligence has found consistent results using a varying 
pool of social categories of participants, such as Steele and Aronson (1995), and 
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Croizet and Claire (1998).  A wide array of studies in stereotype threat have focused on 
inducing threat in participants asked to take a math test using women subjects and have 
been the subject of both threat induction and alleviation (Aronson et al., 1999; Brown & 
Pinel, 2003; Gonzales et al., 2002; Gresky et al., 2005; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; 
Martens et al., 2006; Schmader, 2002; Shih, 1999; Spencer et al., 1999).   An important 
finding obtained by Quinn and Spencer (2001) indicated that women who were 
threatened with gender-based stereotypes were able to equally perform with men on the 
same math test when presented with numerical math problems, but performed in a 
manner consistent with threat when presented with word problems, from which 
participants were asked to formulate and solve math problems.  The authors reasoned 
that in a threatening environment, women were unable to process important information.  
This was later confirmed by Croizet and colleagues (Croizet et al., 2004) who 
demonstrated that stereotype threat produces a disruption in cognitive processes.  
Given the amount of studies focusing on ability-based performance tasks, one may be 
tempted to argue that threat occurs as a result of academic pressure and challenges 
rather than negative stereotype pressures.  However, stereotype threat has also been 
shown to occur in processes outside of traditional academic studies. 
Various studies have shown threat effects appear in non-academic but otherwise 
cognitively demanding tasks, such as the Raven‟s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(Brown & Day, 2006; McKay, Doverspike, Bowen-Hilton, & Martin, 2002; McKay, 
Doverspike, Bowen-Hilton, & McKay, 2003) and in spatial rotation tasks that use tasks 
similar to the Vandenberg Mental Rotation Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978), in which 
participants are threatened with spatial ability stereotypes (Martens et al., 2006, study 2; 
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McGlone & Aronson, 2006) and perform at a decreased level of success, similar to 
those found in verbal and math tests.  In addition to cognition-based performance, 
studies using behavioral outcomes such as athletic ability (Beilock & McConnell, 2004; 
Beilock et al., 2006; Stone, 1999; Stone, 2002; Stone & McWhinnie, 2008), negotiation 
ability (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001) and affective processing (Leyens et al., 
2000) have also shown threat effects.  Clearly, stereotype threat has been shown to 
occur under different experimental manipulations, in various populations, and in a wide 
range of domains.  These results notwithstanding, stereotype threat has previously 
been studied using pre-existing groups and stereotypes and though useful for its 
practical implications, it has yet to be shown that stereotype threat can be 
experimentally created to hang in the air as Steele (1997) would describe.   
Given the available research previously discussed, stereotype threat can occur 
for naturally occurring groups that are stigmatized.  These effects, however, may occur 
for identities that are relevant only in specific instances.  For example, a psychology 
student may find himself under stereotype threat when taking math classes in a class 
full of engineering students despite a relatively minimal identification with the group of 
“psychology student”.  Although the student may not identify with psychology anywhere 
other than school this specific instance may be enough to provoke disruptive thoughts 
about living up to expectations of being weak in math ability.  Alternatively, a highly 
capable individual may join an organizational committee known for underperforming on 
company projects.  After hearing these rumors the individual may worry about being 
seen as one of the failing group members, but also as a failure as an individual 
employee.  This person‟s high ability could be reduced in a manner consistent with 
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stereotype threat.  The current research is interested in providing evidence that 
stereotype threat can occur in individuals identifying with a peripheral group.  This 
research will extend previous literature to show that peripheral groups, though less 
accessible than chronically identified groups, serve as a sufficient factor of stereotype 
threat.   
Minimal Group Paradigm 
 In order to examine stereotype threat using groups without previously held 
negative stereotypes or stigma, these groups would to be created in situations allowing 
for experimental manipulation.  In relation to stereotype threat, the most promising 
advantage of using such a methodology is experimental control over (perceived) stigma 
assigned to a group.  Participants can be assigned to a new group that can have 
positive stereotypes in one domain but negative stereotypes in other domains.  
Additionally, with minor justification and explanation, these groups can also be 
manipulated to be reflective of “internal” qualities with which participants can easily 
identify, such as personality characteristics or tendencies.  Just as one can apply a 
single horoscope to a multiple of individuals, these groups can be framed in such a way 
that individuals will not be motivated to be overly critical of their assignment, which may 
lead to group identification.  These techniques are described in relation to their 
usefulness in researching stereotype threat.  
 The Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP), previously used in Tajfel‟s (1970) 
exploration of the prejudice and more generalized issues of intergroup discrimination, 
seeks to create situations where individuals are allowed to (and often do) discriminate 
between themselves and other members of their group (ingroup) and members of other 
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groups (outgroup).  These groups are experimentally created and have no history or 
otherwise information attached to them other than what the experimenter provides.   
Tajfel‟s (1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) original procedure involved 
(randomly) categorizing individuals into one of two possible groups (e.g. Over-
estimators vs. Under-Estimators) on the presumed basis of a testing procedure such as 
estimating the number of dots seen on a screen or one‟s preference for certain artists 
via painting ratings.  Once categorized, participants were given booklets containing 
matrices in which they were to choose from a selection of yoked rewards for members 
of either their own group (ingroup) or for members of the other group (outgroup).   For 
example, participants could choose to give one person-A 1 point while giving person-B 
14 points, person-A 12 points and person-B 11 points, or person-A 14 points while 
giving person-B 1 point.  Tajfel (1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) found that when given 
information regarding the two recipients‟ group status (ingroup or outgroup), participants 
were likely to discriminate based on group preference.  For example, when participants 
were told to pick an option that involved point distribution to both an ingroup member 
and an outgroup member, they were likely to pick options that created the biggest 
difference between the groups (e.g. 14 points to the ingroup member, 1 point to the 
outgroup member).  When deciding outcomes for two members of either group, 
however, participants were likely to choose outcomes that were of equal fairness to both 
targets (e.g. 12 points to individual A and 12 points to individual B).  These findings 
suggest that the categorization process was a sufficient requirement to promote ingroup 
favoritism.  In contrast to real-world groups in which previous historical rationale or 
social standing may promote realistic group conflict (for a review see Jackson,1993) 
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individuals experimentally grouped together and allowed to discriminate are motivated 
and do so according to a need for a positive social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), 
often achieved through ingroup favorability (see Brewer, 1979; Brewer, 1999).   
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that individuals look 
toward their social categories as a self-reference for their own identity.  Consequently, 
the groups to which individuals belong and their emotional and evaluative meaning 
largely determine the degree to how individual view themselves in society.  Minimal 
group procedures offer an arbitrary identity upon categorization which results in a 
differentiation between groups as a manner of creating a positive social identity.  Tajfel 
and Turner (1979) indicate that for intergroup discrimination to occur, individuals must 
identify with and internalize their group membership as part of their self-concept.  MGP 
studies have largely focused on intergroup discrimination between two arbitrary groups 
resulting from one‟s desire to maintain these positive social identities and as a result, 
levels of identification.  The effects, however, of group categorization have implications 
in stereotyped and stigmatized group situations.   
Minimal group categorization and subsequent discrimination have shown positive 
outcomes for individuals, such as higher self-esteem in individuals who were allowed to 
discriminate once categorized as compared to those who were not allowed to 
discriminate (Lemyre & Smith, 1985).  Likewise, Oakes and Turner (1980) found similar 
effects of increased self-esteem for individuals who have been permitted to discriminate 
between experimentally created groups.  These results support the premise that 
individuals, when confronted with an ambiguous situation (such as MGP), strive to 
maintain a positive self-image in part provided by actively showing ingroup favorability.  
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As a consequence, individuals are psychological rewarded for belonging to 
experimental groups if allowed to maintain their positive self-concept.  If one accepts 
that individuals indeed do identify with experimental groups (if only temporarily), then 
they are likely to also be affected by group-based positive and negative stereotypes 
both psychological and behaviorally.  There is support for performance increases 
following stereotype activation (Shih, Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002), though 
for group members this finding was only shown for implicit (vs. explicit) stereotype 
activation.  Other performance increases have been shown to occur for individuals 
when primed with relevant negative stereotypes of outgroups (for a review, see Walton 
& Cohen, 2001).  Additionally, negative stereotypes of one‟s ingroup have been shown 
to decrease performance in certain situations (e.g. Aronson et al., 1999; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995).  Thus, if individuals do identify with their minimally assigned categories, 
it seems plausible that stereotypes, both positive and negative may influence 
performance outcomes. 
The minimal group paradigm provides a way to create peripheral groups for 
individuals that result in intergroup discrimination as a result of creating a distinction 
between one‟s ingroup and the outgroup.  As discussed these groups and the act of 
discrimination appears to benefit individuals in their self-esteem (e.g. Oakes & Turner, 
1980) and lead to group identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Stereotype threat 
research has shown that stigmatization of a group (when made salient) can lead to 
performance decreases for identified individuals (e.g. Steele & Aronson, 1995).  
Combining these two paradigms allows the current research to examine the outcome of 
stigmatization of peripherally held groups on individuals.  Upon acceptance and 
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identification with one‟s group in the minimal group procedure, subsequent group 
stigmatization may produce stereotype threat effects in a manner similar to prior 
research.   
If minimal groups do provide a way to induce group identification and subsequent 
stereotype activation, it would also seem possible to manipulate the effects of these 
stereotypes in various ways.  For example, work on bifurcation (Gresky et al., 2005; 
Pronin et al., 2004) has shown that stereotypes can be influential as a function of how 
much one‟s temporal self-concept is linked to a stigmatized group.  These 
manipulations have served to alter the impact of negative stereotypes as they relate to 
the individual by “spreading out” the implications of negative group-based stereotypes 
on one‟s self-concept.   
Additional work has shown that individuals who are aware of negative 
stereotypes for important self-conceptual groups have shown a decreased link between 
the self and group ties via trait or behavioral dissociation, such as high math-identified 
women dissociating themselves from feminine traits stereotypic of poor math 
performance (Pronin et al., 2004).  Tajfel and Turner (1979) discuss various theoretical 
principles derived from SIT and argue that “When social identity is unsatisfactory, 
individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively 
distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct.”  If minimally 
categorized individuals are presented with negative stereotypes of their new group, they 
may either attempt to identify with other groups or identify more closely with their group 
as a way of bolstering their self-concept, likely leading to higher discrimination and 
differentiation if allowed.  There does not appear to be any research indicating whether 
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or not individuals will suffer as a result of stigma attached to their experimental group 
nor if they will attempt to dissociate or bolster their group identification in the face of 
negative stigma.  Nonetheless, it appears relevant to test if individuals can be negatively 
affected through minimal groups and their associated stigmata.   
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Chapter 2 
Rationale 
According to Schmader and colleagues (Schmader et al., 2008, p. 339) “even if 
one is not chronically identified with a negatively stereotyped group, manipulations can 
temporarily prime a sense that the group defines the self, inducing the cognitive 
imbalance that underlies stereotype threat.”  Following this logic, the minimal group 
paradigm can likely be applied experimentally to induce stereotype threat.  All 
previously cited studies used pre-existing groups and stigma to induce threat, but fail to 
address that the stigma used had been previously known, if not also believed, by 
threatened individuals.  Albeit this issue may be less important as to the real-world 
applications of stereotype threat, it seems worthwhile to examine the effects of stigma 
through laboratory manipulation.  Following this line of inquiry no past study has shown 
that the negative stereotypes used need to be accepted or even known.  Indeed, Steele 
(1997, p. 618), in discussing general features of stereotype threat, says “To experience 
stereotype threat, one need not believe the stereotype nor even be worried that it is true 
of oneself.”  Steele further goes on to define stereotype threat as a process in which 
negative group-based stereotypes become “self-relevant” and serve as the lens through 
which the individual‟s behavior is viewed or interpreted.  Upon realizing the implications 
of their group‟s stigma on their own performance, individuals suffer as a result of 
increased anxiety or threat.  This being the case, using negative stereotypes associated 
with experimentally created groups may fulfill the psychological requirement to create 
stereotype threat.  If individuals identify with a peripheral group, although only 
temporally, a stigma regarding their performance on an ability-diagnostic tasks may 
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produce stereotype threat effects.  One of the benefits of using experimentally created 
groups is the lack of participant awareness of these groups, which allows the 
experimenter to prime or manipulate the degree to which the groups are stigmatized, as 
well as to control for the stigma history of the group or for learned coping mechanisms.  
Additionally, minimal group research has shown consistent ego-relevant effects (e.g. 
Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980) for categorized individuals as well as in-
group favoritism as indicative of group identity formation.   
Assuming that stereotype threat does occur for experimentally created groups, 
previous research on identity bifurcation (Pronin et al., 2004) would suggest that the 
more participants are closely identified with their new group, the more their performance 
should suffer as a function of threat.  Additionally, as Gresky and colleagues (2005) 
showed, multiple group level identification may make for moderated levels of threat 
effects through group self-identification processes.   
 The present research has multiple hypotheses tested with two studies.  The first 
study will investigate the outcome of placing individuals into stigmatized experimental 
groups to look for evidence of stereotype threat as a result of threat priming and 
strength of spontaneous group identification.  It is hypothesized that individuals placed 
into a peripherally held but stigmatized group will perform more poorly on tasks than 
those placed into a non-stigmatized group.  The second study will examine the outcome 
of group self-identification priming in a minimal group paradigm.  Specifically, those who 
are primed with fewer self-relevant identities will identify more with their experimental 
group than those primed with many social categories.  A second hypothesis is that 
those who are primed with fewer self-relevant identities will perform poorer on tasks 
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than those primed with many self-relevant identities.  The third hypothesis will also be 
tested in both studies in such that it is expected that group identification will mediate the 
stereotype threat effect in that those who more highly identify with their group will suffer 
more threat, which will produce poorer performance.   
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Chapter 3 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred eighteen undergraduate students (29 men, 89 women) participated 
in exchange for course credit.   All participants were native English speakers. 
Procedure 
 Participants were run in groups of two to four and were instructed that the 
current study involved looking at relationships between personality, perceptual styles, 
and verbal ability.  Participants were instructed that they would first be asked to provide 
likeability ratings for a selection of paintings that had previously been used in the past to 
successfully place individuals into one of two distinguishable personality types and 
perceptual preference based on an individual‟s ratings of the paintings.  They were then 
told that these two personality groups were different across various domains, including 
verbal skill.  Thus, after providing ratings of the paintings and ostensibly providing the 
experimenter with their personality type and were told they would complete a test 
previously used to measure individual differences in verbal ability.   
Participants‟ evaluations were based on random assignment as they entered the 
lab; participants were either told they had a Convergent personality (N = 39), a 
Divergent personality (N = 23), or were told their evaluation would be used in later data 
analyses and would not be revealed to them (N = 56).1  Those given a Convergent 
evaluation were told “Convergent personalities prefer to process visual and semantic 
information in a bottom-up fashion; that is, they prefer to examine details first to form an 
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overall impression.” while those given a Divergent evaluation were told “Divergent 
personalities prefer to process visual and semantic information in a top-down fashion; 
that is, they prefer to first form an overall impression and then consider details 
afterward.”  The provided information is similar to the information provided by Ashburn-
Nardo and colleagues (2001) to their participants.  
After participants were told of their personality type, they then went on to the 
assessment of verbal ability on the RAT.  The experiment had four conditions and all 
participants run in a single session were in the same condition though they did not 
interact in any way.  
Threat: Participants received a group identity via a personality evaluation, 
were told that an upcoming verbal test was a highly diagnostic 
measurement of verbal ability, and received information that cast the 
group to which they were “evaluated” in a negative light regarding verbal 
ability; Lift: Participants received a group identity via a personality 
evaluation, were told that an upcoming verbal test was a highly diagnostic 
measurement of verbal ability, and received information that cast the 
group to which they were “evaluated” in a positive light regarding verbal 
ability; Difficult: Participants did not receive a group identity and were told 
that an upcoming verbal test was a highly diagnostic measurement of 
verbal ability; Control: Participants did not receive a group identity and 
were told that an upcoming verbal test was a pilot study and was not 
diagnostic of any ability. 
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 Participants were instructed to turn on the computer in front of them, which 
presented much of the stimulus and study instructions through Media Lab software.  
Upon turning on the computer, participants answered questions from the Academic 
Identity Scale (Smith & White, 2001).  After completing this scale, participants were told 
that the next task to be completed was a painting-rating task that had been used in the 
past to distinguish between two different personality types.  Participants were presented 
with a painting on the computer monitor and were then asked to rate 20 abstract art 
paintings on a 6pt forced choice scale anchored with 1 (Dislike Strongly) and 6 (Like 
Strongly).  The pictures were obtained through an Internet search and were not related 
to each other in any systematic fashion.   
After proceeding through all 20 paintings participants were given information 
pertaining to the two specific personality types and were told to await their personality 
evaluation, which was supposedly based on their responses.  After receiving their 
evaluation information, participants were asked to complete a trait-rating scale for 
Convergent and Divergent personality groups.  The trait-ratings consisted of 10 pairs of 
adjectives placed as anchors on a 7pt scale (e.g. 1 (Boring) to 7 (Interesting); Appendix 
1).  Participants given a Convergent personality rated the Convergent group first, then 
the Divergent group; participants given a Divergent personality rated the Divergent 
group first, then the Convergent group; participants not given an evaluation rated the 
two groups in a random order chosen by the computer.  Upon completion of this scale, 
participants then answered nine questions on a 7pt scale using anchors of 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) and 7 (Strongly Agree) taken from a questionnaire designed to assess an 
individual‟s identification with a personally relevant social group (Leach, Zomeren, 
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Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, & Doosje, 2008; Appendix 2).  For example, participants told 
they were a Convergent personality were asked to respond with their agreement to 
statements such as “I think other Convergent personalities and I would work well 
together.” and “I am glad I am a Convergent personality.”   
After completing the two questionnaires, participants were then provided with 
instructions for a verbal ability test, which was comprised of items from the compound 
Remote Association Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962).  The items on the compound RAT are 
comprised of three words and the goal is to generate a single word that would attach 
either before or after all three words to create three new compound words (e.g. 
stockpile, stockmarket, stockroom).  Thirty items were taken from a normative database 
provided by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003; Appendix 4).  There were two sets of 
instructions provided for the RAT.   
The difficult instructions indicated to the participant that the upcoming test was a 
series of diagnostic items used in previous research to distinguish between those with 
high and low levels of natural verbal ability.  The easy instructions indicated to the 
participant that the upcoming test was a pilot test of lab-related materials and though 
they should take it seriously it did not predict high or low verbal ability levels.   
Additionally, participants in the Threat and Lift conditions received further 
instructions regarding past ability of their respective group members.  Specifically, those 
in the Threat condition were told that previous group members (of their personality 
evaluation) had performed very poorly in comparison to the other personality group and 
had created an expectation for future group members to perform poorly as well.  
Participants in the Lift condition were told that previous group members (of their 
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personality evaluation) had performed very strongly in comparison to the other 
personality group and had created an expectation for future group members to perform 
strongly as well.   
 After reading instructions for completing the test participants were given four 
example items to familiarize themselves with the item format and then were asked to fill 
out several expectation-related items (Appendix 3), which were used to assess 
participants‟ expectations for their upcoming performance.  The items were scored on a 
7pt scale using anchors of 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly Agree).  For example, 
participants read items such as “I believe that I will perform much better than the 
average student on the word association test.”  After completing the expectation 
questionnaire, participants were given an opportunity to clarify test procedures and were 
then instructed to start the test.  Of the 30 items provided, participants were given 30 
seconds to complete each item.  If participants did not provide an answer after 30 
seconds, the item was considered incomplete and the next item appeared.   
 Once participants had completed the 30 items, they were then asked to fill out a 
series of post-study questions (Appendix 5), including manipulations checks (e.g. “I 
noticed distinct differences in the paintings I viewed.” and “My perceptual and thinking 
style would best be characterized as.” and other test-related measures (e.g. “How well 
do you think you did on the verbal task?”).  Participants then provided demographic 
information, were fully debriefed, and were then thanked and dismissed.   
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To check if participants felt the painting preference task was believable, they 
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were asked in the post-RAT questionnaire two questions regarding this task.  The first 
statement read “I noticed distinct differences in the paintings I viewed.” and presented 
participants with a 7pt scale using anchors of 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly 
Agree).  A one-sample t-test was conducted to see if participants‟ average response 
differed from the midpoint of 4, which would indicate a “Neither” or “Don‟t know” 
response.  This analysis indicated that participants, on average (M = 5.33), did appear 
to “see” a difference in the paintings, t (117) = 10.35, p < .001.  Additionally, the four 
conditions did not differ on their response to this question, F (3, 114) = 1.36, p = .256  
Participants were asked to indicate their previously given personality evaluation 
by selecting an answer to the following statement:“Based on the results obtained from 
earlier information, my perceptual and thinking style would best be characterized as.” 
which used a 7pt scale with anchors of 1 (Convergent Personality) and 7 (Divergent 
Personality).  An independent sample t-test indicated that those given evaluations of 
Convergent Personalities (M = 2.10) and Divergent Personalities (M = 5.13) significantly 
differed on their response to this item, t (60) = -6.96, p < .001, indicating that 
participants correctly identified with their previously supplied evaluation.  Additional 
analyses conducted separately for Convergent and Divergent Personalities were 
conducted to examine if participants‟ average response differed from the midpoint of 4, 
which would indicate a “Neither” or “Don‟t know” response.  These analyses indicated 
that participants told that they were Convergent Personalities did significantly differ from 
the midpoint, t (38) = -6.57, p < .001, as did those given a Divergent Personality 
evaluation, t (22) = 3.99, p=< .001.  Additionally, participants not given a category, on 
average (M = 4.07) did not differ significantly from the midpoint of 4, t(55) = .35, p = 
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.725, suggesting they did not spontaneously identify with either group. 
 It was also important to show that participants also showed an ingroup 
favorability, as assessed by the trait-ratings of the two groups.  Thus, it would be 
expected that participants would evaluate their respective ingroup subjectively higher 
than their respective outgroup.   All scores were re-coded to indicate whether they were 
judging their own personality category (ingroup) or their opposing category (outgroup).  
Across all categorize participants, there was a significant difference shown in their 
ratings of a participant‟s ingroup and outgroup by a correlated sample t-test, t (61) = 
4.47, p <.001, with the average ingroup rating (M = 4.97) being higher than the average 
outgroup rating (M = 4.31).  Additionally, a one-sample t-test was performed to show 
that participants did respond to the group identification questionnaire in a manner 
indicating group affiliation.  This test indicated participants‟ average group identification 
(M = 4.93) was significantly different from the midpoint of 4, t (61) = 12.08, p <.001.  
Participants did not appear to differ in their identification based on the evaluation they 
received (i.e. Convergent vs. Divergent), t (60)= .740, p = .462 or differ between 
participants who received a group evaluation (i.e. Threat and Lift), t (60) = -.400, p = 
.691.  Overall, it appeared that the participants did show ingroup favorability and 
identification to their minimally assigned group.  
Performance Analyses 
 Participants‟ responses to the RAT were first analyzed to ensure that all 
participants followed instructions for completing the items, of which nine participants 
had not and were removed from subsequent analyses leaving data for 109 participants.  
Of the 30 items possible, scores were created by summing the number of items 
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correctly answered.  These scores ranged from 6 to 24, with a mean score of 13.53 (SD 
= 3.81). Participants‟ scores on the RAT were first analyzed using a One-Way ANOVA 
design with the participant‟s condition as the factor.  This analysis did not return a 
significant difference between the different conditions as can be seen in Table 1, F 
(3,105) = 1.36, p = .259.  A series of contrast tests were conducted to explore possible 
differences between the three manipulated conditions and the control group, however 
none of the differences were significant (all ps = ns).  Given that the earlier ANOVA 
included two groups that did not receive instructions pertinent to a personally relevant 
group a separate independent sample t-test was conducted between the Threat and Lift 
groups.  This analysis did not indicate significant differences between those who 
received negative information about their group‟s previous ability (M = 14.59) and those 
who received positive information regarding past performance (M = 12.67), t (55) = 
1.86, p = .069, η2 = .059.  The direction of the means and the condition in which they 
occurred is something to be noted, however, and will be discussed below.  It was further 
hypothesized that the one‟s score on the English subscale of the AIS would be useful as 
a covariate as to remove variance associated with a self-report measure of English 
ability on a test described as one of verbal knowledge.  An ANCOVA between all four 
conditions was not significant, F (3, 104) = .938. p = .425, nor was an ANCOVA 
between the Threat and Lift conditions, F (1, 54) = 1.964. p = .167.  It should be noted, 
however, that participants‟ English subscale score was not related to participants‟ RAT 
score, r (109) = .15, p = .121. 
Given the lack of expected findings, further exploratory analyses were 
conducted.  An ANOVA was conducted using a 2x2 design with Gender (Male vs. 
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Female) and condition (Threat vs. Lift) as the factors.  There was a main effect for 
gender F (1, 53) = 4.08, p = .048, η2 = .071 and a main effect for condition, F (1, 53) = 
5.44, p = .026, η2 = .09.  These findings were qualified by a significant interaction, F (1, 
53) = 4.49, p = .039, η2 = .078.  As can be seen in Table 2, this interaction occurred as 
a function of males in the Threat condition outperforming males in the Lift condition as 
well as males in the Threat condition outperforming females in both conditions.   
 Post-Performance Analyses 
 Participants were asked to answer two statements regarding their thoughts on 
future testing procedures on hypothetical future participants and their performance on 
the RAT.  The first question asked, “In future experimental sessions, we will continue to 
look at the performance of convergent and divergent personalities on tests of verbal 
ability in group sessions.  In general, which group do you think will succeed the most?”  
Participants were asked to pick between three choices, Convergent, Divergent, or 
neither group. Their choices and whether or not they had heard instructions describing 
their group as able or unable to perform well on the RAT were subjected to a chi-square 
analysis using only responses that had indicated a group selection.  Responses were 
re-coded into choices of ingroup vs. outgroup.  This analysis used only those 
participants who had received a group evaluation during the picture preference task. 
There did not appear to be a significant relationship between being told one‟s group was 
previously successful or unsuccessful on the RAT and their choice of which group 
would be more successful in the future, χ2 (1) = 1.79, p = .181.  Furthermore, a loglinear 
analysis was conducted to test for an interaction between gender (male vs. female), 
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stereotype (positive vs. negative) and future choice (ingroup vs. outgroup).  This 3-way 
interaction was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.08, p = .299. 
Secondly, participants were asked to evaluate their choice for a hypothetical 
partner for the RAT with the question, “If you were given the option to choose a partner 
for the verbal ability test you have just completed, from which group would you prefer a 
partner?”  Again, participants were asked to pick between three choices, Convergent, 
Divergent, or neither group.  Their choices and whether or not they had heard 
instructions describing their group as able or unable to perform well on the RAT were 
subjected to a chi-square analysis using only responses that had indicated a group 
selection.  Responses were re-coded into choices of ingroup vs. outgroup and only 
used choices indicating a group preference. There did not appear to be a significant 
relationship between being told one‟s group was previously successful or unsuccessful 
on the RAT and their choice a future partner from either group, χ2 (1) = 1.48, p = .224.  
Furthermore, a loglinear analysis was conducted to test for an interaction between 
gender (male vs. female), stereotype (positive vs. negative) and future choice (ingroup 
partner vs. outgroup partner).  This 3-way interaction was not significant, χ2 (1) = 2.63, p 
= .105. 
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Chapter 4 
Study 2 
Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred and twenty-three undergraduate students (38 men, 85 women) 
participated in exchange for course credit.   Participants were allowed to participate 
provided they were a native English speaker.     
Procedure 
 The study consisted of a 2 (Stereotype; Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Mapping; 
Simple vs. Complex) design.  All participants were given a Convergent personality 
evaluation.  Participants were run in groups of two to four at a time and after being 
seated were instructed that the current study involved looking at relationships between 
personality and perceptual styles as well as verbal ability.  In addition to tasks presented 
in study 1, participants were also asked to fill out a self-mapping form (see Gresky et al., 
2005).  All participants in a single session were all in the same condition, though they 
never interacted with one another.   
The procedure for study 2 followed a similar format as the procedure in study 1.  
Participants were given introductory information, completed the AIS, completed the 
painting preference task, received their Convergent personality evaluation, and then 
answered questionnaires assessing group trait ratings and group identification. Upon 
completion of the questionnaires, participants were given a form on which they were to 
“map” their various social identities.  Participants in the “simple” condition had six circles 
surrounding a space for the participants‟ name in the middle and those in the “complex” 
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condition had 18 circles surrounding a space for their name.  Participants were 
instructed to think of their personal social identities through both terminology 
explanations as well as a pre-made example form, supposedly from an earlier 
participant.  Participants were guided to indicate their name in the middle space, to 
indicate their previously indicated personality type in one of the circles, and to then fill 
the remaining circles with self-identified social identities (e.g. their race, their school 
major, their employment, etc; Appendix 6).  Participants were not limited in time but 
were asked to complete all the circles before moving on to the next task.   
After completing the identity mapping form, participants were then provided with 
instructions and examples for the RAT, which used the same items as in study 1.  The 
instructions provided were similar to that of study 1, in that those in the threat condition 
were given instructions that the upcoming test was a series of diagnostic items used in 
the previous studies to distinguish between those with high and low levels of natural 
verbal ability and that previous group members (of their personality evaluation) had 
performed very poorly in comparison to the other personality group, thus creating an 
expectation for future group members to perform poorly as well.  Those in the lift 
condition were given the same test diagnosticity information, but were informed that 
previous group members (of their personality evaluation) had performed very strongly in 
comparison to the other personality group and had created an expectation for future 
group members to perform strongly as well.  After hearing the instructions, participants 
completed the example items and filled out a questionnaire assessing test expectations 
regarding their upcoming performance on the RAT.  Participants were given 30 seconds 
per item and were presented with 30 items total.  Upon completing the RAT participants 
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filled out a post-study questionnaire, indicated demographic information and were then 
dismissed. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To check if participants felt if the painting preference task was believable, they 
were asked in the post-RAT questionnaire two questions regarding this task.  The first 
statement read “I noticed distinct differences in the paintings I viewed.” and presented 
participants with a 7pt scale using anchors of 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly 
Agree).  A one-sample t-test was conducted to see if participants‟ average response 
differed from the midpoint of 4, which would indicate a “Neither” or “Don‟t Know” 
response.  This analysis indicated that participants, on average (M = 5.55), did appear 
to “see” a difference in the paintings, t (122) = 12.32, p < .001. Additionally, the four 
conditions did not differ on this question, F (3, 119) = 1.13, p = .34.  Secondly, 
participants were asked to indicate their previously given personality evaluation by 
selecting an answer to the following statement: “Based on the results obtained from 
earlier information, my perceptual and thinking style would best be characterized as.” 
which used a 7pt scale with anchors of 1(Convergent Personality) and 7 (Divergent 
Personality).  A one-sample t-test was conducted to see if participants‟ average 
response differed from the midpoint of 4, which would indicate a “Neither” or “Don‟t 
Know” response.  This analysis indicated that participants, on average (M = 1.67), did 
agree with, or at least recall correctly, their personality evaluation, t (122) = -21.71, p < 
.001.  Additionally, the four conditions did not differ on their ability to correctly identify 
their previously supplied group, F (3, 119) = .297, p = .828.   
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 It was also important to show that participants (who were all evaluated as 
Convergent personalities) also showed an ingroup favorability, as assessed by the trait-
ratings of the two groups.  Thus, it would be expected that participants would evaluate 
their ingroup (Convergent) subjectively higher than the outgroup (Divergent).  A 
correlated sample showed a significant difference in the trait-ratings, t (122) = 10.59, p 
<.001, with the average Convergent rating (M = 5.46) being higher than the average 
Divergent rating (M = 4.26).  Group differences on ingroup favorability were not found to 
be significant, F (3, 119) = .090, p = .965.  Additionally, a one-sample t-test was 
performed to show that participants did respond to the group identification questionnaire 
in a manner indicating group affiliation.  This test indicated a significant difference 
between the average group identification measure (M = 5.29) and the expected 
midpoint of 4, t (122) = 18.26, p <.001.  Levels of identification did not appear to differ 
significant between conditions, F (3, 114) = .448, p = .719. Overall, it appeared that the 
participants did show ingroup favorability and identification to their minimally assigned 
group.  
 A final manipulation check was performed by analyzing whether or not those 
placed in the “Simple” mapping group found the mapping task more or less difficult than 
those in the “Complex” mapping group, which was viewed integral to the “spreading” of 
one‟s personal identity.  Thus, an independent-sample t-test was conducted, however it 
did not appear that the two groups differed on their perceptions of the task difficulty, t 
(114) = -1.28, p = .202, suggesting that the map manipulation may have been 
ineffective. 
Performance Analyses 
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Participants‟ responses to the RAT were first analyzed to ensure that all 
participants followed instructions for completing the items, of which two participants had 
not and were removed from subsequent analyses.  Of the 30 items possible, scores 
were created by summing the number of items correctly answered.  These scores 
ranged from 5 to 22, with a mean score of 13.06 (SD = 3.44). Participants‟ scores on the 
RAT were first analyzed using a 2 (Threat vs. Lift) x 2 (Simple vs. Complex) ANOVA 
design.  As seen in Table 5, this analysis did not return main effect for either factor nor 
was the expected interaction significant, F (1,117) = 2.12, p = .148.  Based on the 
significant positive relationship between participants‟ RAT scores and the English 
subscale of the Academic Identity scale (r (121) = .20, p = .027), an ANCOVA was also 
conducted on participants‟ RAT scores to examine possible effects after controlling for 
self-reported English ability and interest.  This analysis also did not return the expected 
interaction, F (1,116) = 2.53, p = .115.   
Seeking to replicate the gender differences observed in study 1, an ANOVA was 
conducted using a 2x2 design with Gender (Male vs. Female) and condition (Threat vs. 
Lift) on the RAT scores.  This interaction was not significant, F (1,117) = 3.91, p = .570.  
An ANCOVA using the same factors but controlling for self-reported English 
identification also returned a non-significant interaction, F (1,116) = .205, p = .652.   
Post-Performance Analyses 
 Participants were asked to answer two statements regarding their thoughts on 
future testing procedures on hypothetical future participants and their performance on 
the RAT.  The first question asked, “In future experimental sessions, we will continue to 
look at the performance of convergent and divergent personalities on tests of verbal 
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ability in group sessions.  In general, which group do you think will succeed the most?”  
Participants were asked to pick between two choices, convergent or divergent 
personalities.  Their choices and whether or not they had heard instructions describing 
their group as able or unable to perform well on the RAT were subjected to a chi-square 
analysis.  This analysis indicated a significant asymmetrical distribution of choices, χ2 
(1) = 6.23, p = .013, which was driven by those who heard that their group was highly 
successful at the RAT and picked convergent personalities as more likely to succeed on 
the RAT more than divergent personalities in future testing (see Table 6).  A loglinear 
analysis was also conducted to test for an interaction between gender (male vs. 
female), condition (threat vs. lift), and future choice (convergent vs. divergent).  This 3-
way interaction was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.24, p = .265. 
 Secondly, participants were asked to evaluate their choice for a hypothetical 
partner for the RAT with the question, “If you were given the option to choose a partner 
for the verbal ability test you have just completed, from which group would you prefer a 
partner?”  Again, participants were forced to choose between either convergent or 
divergent personalities.  A significant asymmetrical distribution of choices appeared, χ2 
(1) = 22.19, p < .001, which was driven by those who heard their group was highly 
incompetent at the RAT and indicated that they would prefer an individual evaluated as 
having a Divergent personality as their partner as compared to having a fellow 
Convergent personality (see Table 7).  A loglinear analysis was also conducted to test 
for an interaction between gender (male vs. female), condition (threat vs. lift), and future 
choice (convergent partner vs. divergent partner).  This 3-way interaction was 
significant, χ2 (1) = 4.88, p = .027.  The summary table for these data can be found in 
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Table 8.  As can be seen in these data, women were more likely than men to be 
influenced by their condition (i.e. group-based performance expectancies) when 
deciding on a future partner. 
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Chapter 4 
General Discussion 
 Across two studies, attempts were made to lead participants to believe they 
belonged to a minimally-assigned group to which there were either positive or negative 
expectations of verbal ability based on their group membership.  In both studies 
participants appeared to believe the so-called personality evaluations provided, 
identified with their respective group as measured by questions aimed at their level of 
identification with said group as well as associated more positive qualities to their own 
(in)group as compared to the outgroup.  Both studies, however, failed to find support for 
the performance-based hypotheses; performance on a verbal ability based test did not 
differ as a function of group-based expectations.  In study 1 there was an unexpected 
gender difference whereby men who were told they were expected to perform poorly did 
better than both men who were told they were expected to do well and better than 
women given either group-based expectation.  This difference was not replicated in 
study 2, however, thus limiting the current research‟s ability to suggest a gender 
difference in response to an ego-challenging and presumed self-relevant (via one‟s 
group) expectation.   
In study 2 participants favored their group and desired a future partner from their 
ingroup (over the outgroup) when they were led to believe that their group excelled at 
verbal abilities yet reversed this trend when they believed their group generally did not 
perform well on verbal tests.  Given the partially supported cognitive and motivational-
based hypotheses related to group identification and preference, there yet remains 
hope for minimal-group affiliation-driven effects in a manner not all that dissimilar to 
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traditional stereotype threat findings (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  That is, although the 
focal purpose of impairing and improving verbal ability test performance based on one‟s 
peripherally held group identity was not realized, there appear to be possible changes in 
the experimental design of the current research that could prove fruitful in future work. 
Current Research and Limitations 
 There has been work examining the moderating effect of self-to-group 
identification in traditional stereotype threat (e.g. Davis, Aronson, & Salinas, 2006; 
Schmader, 2002).  Furthermore, the model briefly discussed in the introduction by 
Schmader and colleagues (2008) also suggests that group identification is one of the 
three core components of stereotype threat effects.  In the current studies, it may have 
been the case that participants did not feel a strong enough affiliation with the 
experimentally created group.  Although in both studies participants did respond to 
various measures in ways that would suggest group identification, this may not have 
been effective for multiple reasons.  The more simple reason is that although 
participants answered the questions provided in an identification-consistent manner, 
they may not have fully linked their self-identity to the group regardless of the group 
stereotype eventually provided.  Alternatively, participants may have chosen to 
disregard the so-called personality test once they heard that their group was expected 
to perform poorly on the verbal task as a means of self- and ego-protection.  This 
rationale may have trouble explaining the negligible impact of hearing about positive 
expectations, however, as it appears that individuals like to think of themselves as 
better than other people on a variety of tasks (Greenwald, 1980, Taylor & Brown, 1988).  
It could be also be possible that participants, upon hearing the successful performance 
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expectations, disassociated from their group as means to provide a future excuse for 
poor performance; that is, if a participant fails to meet the high expectations, one‟s ego 
may be protected by denying one‟s membership of a typically successful group.   
Nonetheless, actual identification may not have occurred regardless of the results 
provided by the identification measures. 
 Aside from concerns regarding participant‟s identification with their group (or the 
lack thereof), the performance measure may not have been adequately chosen.  The 
Remote Association Test (Mednick, 1962) is considered to be a test of insight (e.g. 
Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998), or the process by which an answer “instantly” seems 
obvious to an individual when presented with a test item.  During the debriefing process, 
many participants in both studies of the current research indicated that they were either 
to come up with the answer immediately upon item presentation or were unable to 
answer the items at all in the time provided.  Though not conclusive with non-recorded 
descriptions of the participants‟ self-reported on-line processes involved in item solving, 
it may have been the case whereby participants did not experience difficulty in 
answering the problem as they may have been too easy, thus answered immediately, or 
too difficult resulting in many incorrect or non-answers.  Although formal analyses were 
not conducted on the items answered, it did appear that many of the same items were 
answered correctly by a vast majority of the participants while difficult items answered 
correctly seemed randomly dispersed.  Central to this issue is the disruption of working 
memory by which the stereotype phenomenon has been theorized to occur (see 
Beilock, et al., 2007; Croizet et al., 2004; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schamder et al., 
2008), thereby disrupting critical thinking skills.  Although working memory may have 
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indeed been affected by the current research‟s manipulations, working memory may 
have been less integral to the successful answering of these specific RAT problems 
than would be expected of more common tests, such as difficult math or verbal 
comprehension questions.   
Other informal evidence found in the response pattern of certain items, however, 
may suggest otherwise.  The incorrect answers provided by participants to a number of 
items did appear to follow a common theme in which they responded with a single word 
that would link with two of the three presented words.  The third word in the list, 
however, clearly was not related to the answered provided.  (e.g. ache with tooth, heart, 
and potato).  This may suggest a disruption in the controlled processes of verbal 
comprehension as individuals proficient in the English language would recognize an 
incorrect pairing of two words to form a compound word/phrase, but if one‟s attention 
were focused on one‟s performance (possibly as a result of a group-based performance 
expectation) rather than recognizing the correct answer, the manipulations may have 
been successful but ultimately were misdirected in their measurement.  The formal 
analyses cannot soundly support this suggestion, although it would suggest possible 
avenues of research using this particular performance outcome.   
 Baring possible issues with on-line processes within the participant (i.e. group 
identification, working memory disruption), the manipulation used may have failed to 
impress upon the participants the necessary level of diagnosticity-of-task typically found 
(and thought necessary) in stereotype threat effects (Schamder et al., 2008; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997).  The instructions provided to the participants prior to 
completing the RAT suggested that the test was linked to generalized verbal ability 
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performance and was similar to items likely to be found on standardized tests such as 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the Graduate Records Exam.  Additionally, the 
instructions provided to convey the group-based expectations may not have been 
enough to produce performance-altering effects.  Participants were only given two 
sentences within the larger body of instructions that suggested that their group either 
did or did not excel on the upcoming test.  It is possible that participants tuned this 
information out, though the choices made for future partners and successful 
performances might suggest otherwise.  Alternatively, participants may not have 
believed that the test itself was indicative of an individual‟s verbal ability in general but 
rather one of a specific nature (e.g. word generation speed).   
 The trend of data in study 1 also suggests a possible performance alteration due 
in part on the manipulations involved, but in the opposite direction.  Work based on the 
biopsychosocial model (see Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996, for a review) suggests that 
anxiety may prompt two different motivational states affecting affective and cognitive 
processes, perhaps improving or impairing some behavioral responses in response to 
goal-directed situations such as successfully completing the RAT.  The first, challenge, 
suggests that individuals feel they have the resources or skill levels to meet the 
demands of a particular situation, where as threat suggests that individuals feel they do 
not have the necessary resources to meet those same demands.   Though the current 
research was not expecting a reversal of the expectation-to-performance relationship, it 
could be the case that participants who were told they were expected (based on their 
group-membership) to perform poorly at the task could have felt they needed to 
effectively prove the expectation wrong in a reactance-like manner.  For those given a 
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positive expectation for RAT performance, they may have felt as though they could not 
live up to the high group-based standard and may have faltered as a result.   
Similar work on regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998) may suggest similar hypotheses 
as the challenge vs. threat research.  Work by Seibt and Förster (2004) indicates that 
positive self-stereotypes may induce a promotion focus, one marked by eagerness and 
other approach-related behaviors whereas negative self-stereotypes may induce 
avoidance-related behaviors marked by vigilance to not perform poorly supported by 
heir results which suggested that positive stereotypes led to faster yet relatively 
inaccurate test responses and negative stereotypes led slower yet relatively more 
accurate test answers.  Furthermore, these authors found an advantage on creative 
tasks for those in an approach state but an advantage for analytic tasks for those in a 
avoidance state.  It was reasoned that those in an approach state are more likely to rely 
on out-of-the-box thinking while those in an avoidance state may prefer to rely on 
algorithms in their thinking.  Though exploration of these findings is limited in the current 
research, participants told they were expected to do poorly were more thorough in their 
selection of responses to the items in the RAT, which could be successfully answered if 
an individual were to selectively apply their possible answer to all three presented words 
until an answer was found.  Those in an approach state, however, may have relied on 
heuristic thinking and presumed that as long as a possible answer fit in well with two of 
the presented words it was also likely to fit the third word without actively confirming this 
possibility.  Further work by Keller (2007) suggests that negative stereotypes can have 
different performance outcomes as a function of one‟s current state of regulatory focus.  
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Although the current work cannot speak to the state of its participants, it does seem 
possible for this to have occurred.   
Future Directions 
The current work suggests various avenues for further work as well as possible 
changes to the present research to explore stereotype threat that may arise from 
peripheral or experimentally created groups and their supposed stigmata.  By 
addressing the concerns of group identification and more actively ensuring that 
participants are able to not only identify with their “personality” group but also are 
motivated to represent them on supposedly diagnostic tasks such as the RAT, the 
group-based expectations should be more likely to have an effect on their performance.  
On a related issue, the manipulations should be better crafted to persuade participants 
that their performance on the RAT is also indicative of future performance in their 
academic career outside of just their “general verbal ability”.  For example, a failing 
performance on more general academic tests (e.g. mathematics, verbal 
comprehension, logic questions) may appear to be more indicative of one‟s skill in 
academia (or lack thereof) as opposed to a task such as the RAT, which may appear to 
rely solely on a large knowledge of common compound words and/or phrases. 
Although increasing the perception of the RAT as a diagnostic test may be one of 
many ways the current research could be improved upon, it would be prudent to first 
validate the RAT as a suitable test for stereotype threat related work.  A search 
indicates that there has yet to be any empirical research using the RAT within a 
stereotype threat paradigm, though generalized verbal ability tests have been used in 
the past (e.g. Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Although RAT performance did not appear to 
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be affected by the current manipulations when considering a given participant‟s 
condition, the observed gender and condition interaction in study 1 does suggest some 
possibility for a real-world difference in threat expectations.  Work by Vick, Seery, 
Blasocovich, and Weisbuch (2008) indicates a gender difference in the physiological 
reactions (i.e. challenge vs. threat) to stereotype threat as a function of hearing either 
gender-biased or gender-neutral test information.  It was observed in the current work 
(study 1) that men performed at a higher level on the RAT when given information that 
they, as a function of their group membership (being male), would perform poorly.  This 
change in performance was not observed in either direction for women (being female).  
Although this finding was not replicated in study 2, it does suggest the possibility of 
gender differences in performance upon learning of group-based expectations and their 
implications for individuals within that group.   
It may be also more beneficial to focus on the strategies of those who scored 
relatively poorly on the RAT than those successfully answering items.  Through informal 
analyses of the response sets of the RAT items, it did appear that there were repeating 
trends in the responses on many of the same items, suggesting there may have been a 
cognitive deficit of full processing, yet evident that thoughtful (though incorrect) 
processing did occur.  Thus, rather than looking only for correct items to determine the 
impact of group-based expectations on individuals, it would be advantageous to 
examine the lack of fully thought out responses as a function of these expectations.   
Additionally, as suggested by the work on the biopsychosocial model (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996) and on regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998) on performance outcomes 
based on one‟s current motivational state, once more basic processes have been 
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determined within the minimal group / stereotype threat paradigm it would be worthwhile 
to examine if these minimal group performance outcomes are moderated by regulatory 
focus as they appear to be in real groups (e.g. gender; Keller, 2007).   
Although the current work‟s hypotheses were only partially supported, it does 
give a line of thought and reasoning toward future work in using this paradigm.  This 
work was partially inspired by the author‟s observed reactions to ad-hoc group-based 
stereotypes in graduate school and in previous undergraduate courses (e.g. some 
areas in psychology are better at statistics than others) regardless of their objective 
truth.  To conclude that ad-hoc groups and their stereotypes have no effect on their 
members would be mistaken.  Although real-world categories (e.g. gender, race, etc) 
may result in often found stereotype-threat effects (Steele, 1998), it would seem likely 
that any group to which an individual identifies with and has subsequent expectations 
based on that group‟s stereotypes should have some sort of meaningful impact on that 
individual‟s performance, independent of the individual‟s objective skill set.  Thus, 
although minimal group stereotype threat effects were not currently supported, other ad-
hoc groups may result in the sort of detrimental effects believe to commonly afflict real-
world groups.   
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Footnotes 
1 Participants were given Convergent or Divergent evaluations as to eliminate any 
potential inherent preference or identification for either group based on individually held 
pre-conceptions or inference of the meaning of the labels.   
51 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Perceptor  Category (Please Circle One):   Convergent Divergent Don‟t Know/Unsure 
 
 
 
For each of the scale items below, write in the number that represents the response closest to your 
feelings and impressions of members of the two estimator groups.  The scale values are on the following 
page. 
 
SCALE ITEM                           Convergent Thinkers   Divergent Thinkers 
 
 
 
Hostile - Friendly                          _____              _____ 
 
Disruptive - Helpful                      _____              _____ 
 
Stupid - Intelligent                        _____             _____ 
 
Difficult to Like - Very Likeable    _____             _____ 
 
Cold - Warm                                 _____             _____ 
 
Boring - Interesting                       _____               _____ 
 
Uncooperative - Cooperative       _____              _____ 
 
Deceitful - Honest                         _____              _____ 
 
Greedy - Unselfish                        _____             _____ 
 
Narrow-Minded - Broad-Minded   _____              _____ 
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                      Group Impressions Scale 
 
Hostile                        Neither                      Friendly 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7  
 
Disruptive                     Neither                       Helpful 
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
1          2          3           4          5          6          7  
 
Stupid                         Neither                   Intelligent 
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
1          2          3           4          5          6          7  
 
Difficult to Like            Neither       Very Likeable 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
 
 
Cold                            Neither                          Warm 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
 
 
Boring                         Neither                   Interesting 
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
1          2          3           4          5          6          7  
 
Uncooperative             Neither                 Cooperative 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
 
 
Deceitful                      Neither                        Honest 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
 
 
Greedy                         Neither                     Unselfish 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
 
 
Narrow-Minded             Neither                  Broad-Minded 
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
1          2          3           4          5          6          7 
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Appendix 2 
INSTRUCTIONS: We would like to obtain some more detailed information about your 
feelings about your group's and the other group's performance.  First, we would like to 
ask you some general questions about how you feel about your group.  Please read 
each of the following items and indicate your agreement with it by writing in the number 
that comes closest to your feelings. 
 
1     2     3       4     5     6     7     8     9 
       Strongly            Neither Agree                    Strongly 
                       Disagree             nor Disagree                       Agree 
 
 
_____  1.  I feel I identify with my group. 
 
_____  2.  I am glad I belong to this group. 
 
_____  3.  I would feel held back by my group. 
 
_____  4.  I think other members of my group and I would work well together. 
 
_____  5.  I see myself as an important member of this group. 
 
_____  6.  I feel I do not fit in well with this group. 
 
_____  7.  I do not consider the group to be important. 
 
_____  8.  I would feel uneasy with other members of this group. 
 
_____  9.  I feel strong ties to this group. 
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Appendix 3 
The following items concern the upcoming task. Please indicate how strongly you 
disagree or agree with each statement.  
 
I expect to perform very well on the word association test. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree           
 
I feel that it is very important to do well on tests of verbal ability, such as the word 
association test. 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree              
 
I feel the word association test will be very difficult. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree              
 
I believe that people similar to me have little verbal processing ability. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree              
 
I believe that I will perform much better than the average student on the word 
association test. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree             
 
I believe that people similar to me do poorly at these types of tests. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree              
 
I believe that I have much ability in verbal processing for tasks such as making word 
associations. 
 
1      2         3           4             5            6      7 
       Strongly            Neutral                      Strongly 
       Disagree                             Agree       
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Appendix 4 
Item # Stimuli Answer 
1 Loser Throat Spot Sore 
2 Night Wrist Stop Watch 
3 Duck Fold Dollar Bill 
4 Dew Comb Bee Honey 
5 Fountain Baking Pop Soda 
6 Cracker Fly Fighter Fire 
7 Measure Worm Video Tape 
8 Worm Shelf End Book 
9 Print Berry Bird Blue 
10 Date Alley Fold Blind 
11 Fox Man Peep Hole 
12 Sleeping Bean Trash Bag 
13 Food Forward Break Fast 
14 Water Mine Shaker Salt 
15 Basket Eight Snow Ball 
16 Cross Rain Tie Bow 
17 Main Sweeper Light Street 
18 Fly Clip Wall Paper 
19 Wagon Break Radio Station 
20 Eight Skate Stick Figure 
21 Foul Ground Mate Play 
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22 Way Board Sleep Walk 
23 Blank List Mate Check 
24 Mouse Bear Sand Trap 
25 Test Runner Map Road 
26 Man Glue Star Super 
27 Tooth Potato Heart Sweet 
28 Wet Law Business Suit 
29 Hold Print Stool Foot 
30 Horse Human Drag Race 
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Appendix 5 
I noticed distinct differences in the paintings I viewed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree     Strongly Agree 
My perceptual or thinking style can be best characterized as  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Convergent       Divergent 
In future experimental sessions, we will continue to look at the performance of 
convergent and divergent thinkers on these types of tasks in group sessions.  In 
general, which group will succeed most at these types of tasks? 
 
                    Convergent Thinkers        Divergent Thinkers      Neither Group  
 
Additionally, in future experimental sessions, we will continue to look at the performance 
of convergent and divergent thinkers on these types of tasks in group sessions.  If you 
were given the option to choose, who you would like as a partner? 
 
              A Convergent Thinker           A Divergent Thinker  No Preference 
 
When going through the verbal ability test, did you worry about how you would perform? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not Very Much     Very Much 
 
When going through the verbal ability test, did you worry about letting your group down? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not Very Much     Very Much 
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Appendix 6 
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Table 1. Mean RAT scores for participants receiving different personality evaluations 
and group-related instructions on the RAT (Experiment 1).  
 Threat Lift Difficult Control 
RAT Score 14.59 12.67 13.15 13.81 
 (4.20) (3.63) (3.26) (4.00) 
 n = 27 n = 30 n = 26 n = 26 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 2. Mean RAT scores as a function of gender and experimental condition 
(Experiment 1). 
 Threat Lift 
Male  17.09 
(4.89) 
n = 11 
12.60 
(2.95) 
n = 10 
 
Female 12.88 
(2.63) 
n = 16 
 
12.70 
(4.00) 
n = 20 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 3. Number of participants choosing which group will do better in the future on the 
RAT based on their received stereotype (Experiment 1). 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
Ingroup  15 
 
8 
 
Outgroup 12 
 
14 
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Table 4. Number of participants choosing a partner from either group for future 
completion of the RAT based on their received stereotype (Experiment 1). 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative Stereotype 
Ingroup  14 
 
8 
 
Outgroup 16 
 
18 
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Table 5. Mean RAT scores for participants receiving identity mapping instructions and 
group-related instructions on the RAT (Experiment 2). 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
Simple Map 12.90 
(3.75) 
n = 31 
13.62 
(3.58) 
n =32 
 
Complex Map 13.38 
(3.17) 
n = 29 
12.28 
(3.22) 
n = 29 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 6. Number of participants choosing which group will do better in the future on the 
RAT based on their received stereotype (Experiment 2). 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
Convergent  43 30 
 
Divergent 18 32 
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Table 7. Number of participants choosing a partner from either group for future 
completion of the RAT based on their received stereotype (Experiment 2). 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
Convergent  36 
 
11 
 
Divergent 25 
 
51 
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Table 8. Number of participants choosing a partner from either group for future 
completion of the RAT based on their received stereotype and their gender (Experiment 
2). 
 Males   Females 
 Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
  Positive 
Stereotype 
Negative 
Stereotype 
Convergent  10 
 
6 
 
 Convergent  26 
 
5 
 
Divergent 10 
 
12 
 
 Divergent 15 
 
39 
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Stereotype threat has been shown to be an important cause of performance 
detriments in various social groups.  It has also been theorized that stereotype threat 
could be applicable to any group so long as the individual believes their performance 
may reinforce the negative stereotype.   The current work attempts to induce stereotype 
threat in participants believing they belong to an experimentally created and negatively 
stereotyped group using a minimal group paradigm.  Across two studies there did not 
appear to be significant performance changes typically observed in stereotype threat 
research.  Various cognitive measures and post-performance inquiries did generally 
support claims that participants were identifying and processing the stereotypes 
according to the instructions provided, suggesting that although performance was not 
affected, traditionally thought stereotype threat processes were occurring.  Unexpected 
gender effects were also observed in both performance and post-test measures and are 
explored where appropriate.  Suggestions for future iterations of the current work are 
suggested in light of the unsupported hypotheses.   
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